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THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD
BANK: CONSTRUCTIVE REFORMER OR
FLY IN THE FUNCTIONAL OINTMENT?
BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE
WORLD BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY. London and New

York: Kegan Paul International, 1992. xvii + 295 pp.
Reviewed by David A. Wirth*
INTRODUCTION

Defined as actions taken by member States that are "unrelated or
inadequately related to the purposes and functions"' of a technically
oriented intergovernmental organization, "politicization" as used in the title
of this book is most definitely a pejorative. Following this definition, the
World Bank becomes a paradigm for a phenomenon that threatens to
"preoccupy and paralyze all of the specialized agencies,"2 consequently

disrupting a functional view of the international order which "assume[s]
that economic, social and technical problems can be separated from
political problems and insulated from political pressures."3
After asserting that the phenomenon of politicization can be identified
by objective legal parameters, the author then engages in a painstaking
proof of the proposition that the abuse of power by member States within
international organizations like the World Bank - "politicization" - is
unilateral economic coercion of borrowing countries, prohibited by
international law. Finally, the book purports to demonstrate that certain
practices related to the governance of the World Bank, such as political
motivation in the exercise of weighted voting privileges and certain cases
of direct instruction of Executive Directors by member country governments, are prohibited by the Bank's constituent treaties and international
law generally.
The principal contribution of this book, a publication of the Graduate
Institute of International Affairs in Geneva, is a series of factually
oriented, carefully documented case studies. Three of these extended
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1. BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD
BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 14 (1992).

2. Id. at 8.
3. Id. at 15.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 15:687

narratives receive especially close attention: (1) the give-and-take between
the Bank and the United Nations over apartheid in South Africa and
Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique; (2) the Bank's
lending policies toward the Allende regime in Chile against a background
of disputes over the adequacy of compensation for governmental expropriation of the property of foreign nationals; and (3) an attempt in the
late 1970s by the United States to preclude the use of its contributions to
the Bank for loans and assistance to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
because the governments of those countries had been insufficiently
responsive to inquiries concerning members of the U.S. military missing
in action in Southeast Asia. Additionally, the book catalogues and
evaluates legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress intended to affect the
Bank's policy toward its borrowers based on criteria such as human rights,
narcotics, nuclear weapons, environment, expropriation of foreign investments, competition with U.S. exports, and policies with respect to missing
U.S. service personnel. The work not only collects these statutory mandates in one place, apparently for the first time, but also describes and
analyzes the implementation of many of the legislative directives relating
to U.S. participation in the World Bank.
I. "POLITICIZATION" AS INCONSISTENCY WITH THE BANK'S
CONSTITUTIONAL GOALS AND PURPOSES

The major strength of this book, by its own terms, supposedly lies in
giving legal content to a phenomenon that previously appears to have been
defined and described primarily in political science terms. The author's
chief measure of "politicization" is consistency with the Bank's goals and
purposes. The constitutional treaties for the primary constituent organizations that make up the World Bank examined in this book - the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 4 and the
International Development Association (IDA)5 - provide the main
guidance for determining the aims of those two international financial
institutions. The author understandably relies heavily on language in the
IBRD and IDA charters under the heading "Political Activity Prohibited"
specifying that
The [international organization] and its officers shall not interfere
in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced

4. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, amended by 16 U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929,
(Dec. 16, 1965) [hereinafter IBRD Articles of Agreement].
5. Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, Jan. 26, 1960, 11
U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter IDA Articles of Agreement].
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in their decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant
to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated [in the relevant treaty]. 6
Based on these provisions, The United States and the Politicizationof the
World Bank then equates "political" considerations in the exercise of
voting rights with "unrelated to the purposes of the World Bank." While
hardly necessary, the book also goes considerably farther. The author
asserts that failure by Bank member States to observe this standard in the
exercise of their voting power may, under some circumstances, rise to the
level of affirmative intervention by the Bank itself in the internal affairs
of a borrowing country of the sort prohibited by the Charter of the United
Nations.' An alternative interpretation, not considered by the author, is that
this provision is intended simply to remove the nature of the borrower's
political character from the Bank's calculus.8 Whichever way one might
be inclined to read this passage in the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the
author's analysis never rises above the level of the tautological. Indeed,
as he himself acknowledges, the test of consistency with the institution's

6. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. IV, § 10, 60 Stat. at 1449, 2 U.N.T.S.
at 158; IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. V, § 6, 11 U.S.T. at 2294, 439 U.N.T.S.
at 266-68; see also IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. 1II, § 5(b), 60 Stat. at 1444,
2 U.N.T.S. at 146 (Bank shall oversee use of loan proceeds "with due attention to considerations
of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or
considerations."); IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. V, § 1(g), 11 U.S.T. at 2292,
439 U.N.T.S. at 264 (Association shall oversee use of loan proceeds "with due attention to
considerations of economy, efficiency and competitive international trade, and without regard
to political or other non-economic influences or considerations.").
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state.").
8. The prohibitions on political activity in the IBRD and IDA charters were
drafted by the British delegation to the Bretton Woods conference to be incorporated
into the treaty establishing the IMF [International Monetary Fund] in order to placate
the Soviet Union [which sent a delegation to the Bretton Woods conference but did
not become a Bank member until 1992 and 1993, when Russia and the former Soviet
republics joined the Bank]. For various reasons, the clause was not inserted in the
IMF agreement, but was incorporated into the IBRD charter in order to assure the
Soviets and other communist countries that the Bank would not try to change their
political systems.
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN

RIGHTS 17 (1993). Echoing this theme, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, referring to the
Bretton Woods Conference, stated that "[a]ll
the discussion was on the economic and financial
requirements of those countries .... [A]t no time was a question raised as to the political

ideology of a country." An Act to Provide For the Participationof the United States in the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development:

Hearings on H.R. 3314 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1945).
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principal objectives is not amenable to precise application, at least in some
cases.
Accordingly, a full inquiry into a particular act's "politicized"
character requires the consideration not just of effect, but a subjective
examination of "intentions ... [which] are fully as important as ... actions."9 The author relies repeatedly on an advisory opinion in which the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded that opposition to the
admission of States to the United Nations based on criteria other than
those set out in the U.N. Charter is legally impermissible.' ° The ICJ's
advisory opinion expressly addressed only a situation in which the
explicitly stated justification' for an action by a member State in an
international organization conflicts with an exclusive list of acceptable
reasons set out in that organization's organic treaty. As the author
acknowledges, however, that opinion specifically does not address
improper motives for which there is no objective evidence. In such a case,
said the Court, "reasons, which enter into a mental process, are obviously
subject to no control."" One way of looking at the lesson of this opinion
is that votes in international organizations can be supported by even the
thinnest rationale consistent with the aims of the organization in question.
In the case of the World Bank, all that arguably would be necessary is a
mildly plausible veneer of economic justification.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Bank's professional staff has been largely
unsuccessful in embellishing this learning by enumerating impermissible
political factors with precision. The author of this book documents
statements from the early years of the Bank's history that identify
conditions of political instability or uncertainty as economic factors
relevant to the Bank's decisionmaking. A recent memorandum prepared
by the Bank's General Counsel reinforces that linkage in the potentially
very large and poorly defined category of cases in which political instability, doubtful domestic security, political changes, partial or complete
foreign occupation, or civil strife may acceptably be considered in the
Bank's determination of creditworthiness. 2 One obvious consequence of
this approach is the context-dependent flexibility that it leaves for the
Bank's staff to define the terms "political" and "economic" in particular
cases.

9. BROWN, supra note 1, at 229.
10. Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United
Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), 1947-48 1.C.J. 57 (May 28, 1948).
11. Id. at 60.
12. Ibrahim F.l. Shihata, The World Bank and "Governance" Issues in its Borrowing
Members, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 53, 75-76 (Franziska Tschofen &
Antonio R. Parm eds., 1991).
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The author's own case studies ultimately demonstrate the profound
difficulty in applying a test of motive in determining the validity of acts
by and within an intergovernmental organization. These case studies and
other factual data provided by the author support several generic conclusions. First, the Bank's professional staff is sufficiently insulated by
the institutional structure of the international organization that it can resist
political pressures, at least up to a point. On the other hand, institutional
dynamics at the Bank can change at the insistence of donor country
governments with the most clout in the institution because they give the
most money and hold the largest number of votes. Moreover, the Bank's
professional staff can - when it chooses or when it is compelled out of
political necessity - link economic and political issues in a determination
of creditworthiness that excludes purely political considerations. So, the
Bank terminated assistance to Chile during the Allende period while
denying a political motivation. 3 Similarly, then-World Bank President
Robert McNamara promised to suspend lending to Vietnam for economic,
not political, reasons. As The United States and the Politicizationof the
World Bank acknowledges, this overlap between "political" and
"economic" considerations makes it very difficult to dissect and categorize
a particular case after the fact either neatly or definitively
Consequently, "politicization" is identified in this bookpredominately
through an inductive process that relies on the case-by-case enumeration
of empirical examples that the author chooses to characterize as animated
by political goals. In attempting to craft a more precise legal test of
"politicization," the author admits the arduous nature of determining
whether a State has deviated from obligations to refrain from impermissible political behavior as defined, for instance, by the organic, constituent
instrument of an international organization like the World Bank. 4 By
contrast, ascertaining whether a State's rights have been affected by
impermissible "politicization," as distinct from a State's failure to observe
its legal commitments, is said to be more susceptible of identification from
a legal point of view. As discussed below, the book's treatment of this
latter question has serious analytical flaws. Moreover, definition of the
term "economic," which characterizes those activities that clearly fall
within the goals and purposes of the institution, receives scant attention.
Consequently, the book largely fails to deliver on its cardinal pledge that
"politicization can be defined not only as a political phenomenon, but as
a legal phenomenon as well."' 5

13. BROWN, supra note 1, at 161.

14. Id.at 27.
15. Id.at 7.
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Perhaps some of the case studies involving clearer examples of
political motivation, such as the cutoff of aid to Vietnam, can be explained
by the author's analysis. Other cases present considerably greater difficulties. For example, legislation mandating U.S. opposition to loans that
might increase competition with U.S. agricultural exports, including palm
oil, sugar, and citrus crops, is one of the most egregious examples of
unilateral, protectionist self-interest described in the book. But while there
might be other good reasons why this policy is poorly judged or even
illegal, it does not fail for want of strictly economic motivation. From the
point of view of this book, treatment of this legislation is further complicated by its stated purpose of "combat[ting] hunger and malnutrition and16
countries."
... encourag[ing] economic development in the developing
The author makes no attempt whatsoever to reconcile this stated intent,
which is presumably consistent with the Bank's goals and purposes, with
the operative effect of the statutory directive by describing a methodology
that might be applied in other cases of incongruity between the two.
Especially revealing is the author's praise for the "constructive" 1 7
efforts by the United States, the primary "politicizing" protagonist, through
legislation adopted by the U.S. Congress and interventions from the
Executive Branch, to improve the Bank's environmental performance.
Unlike other instances of "politicization," this policy agenda is said to
advance the interests of all Bank member countries, to conform to
principles of multilateralism as demonstrated by the support of other
members, and to enhance the Bank's fundamental economic mission. 8 By
contrast, the author claims that similar U.S. laws designed to advance
universal international norms for the protection of human rights, which
have considerably deeper underpinnings in international law than virtually
any multilateral standards for protection of the environment, are "primarily
political rather than economic."' 9
By distinguishing environment as virtually the sole example of apolitical attempts by the United States to influence World Bank policies, the
author reveals serious cracks in his intellectual edifice. He concludes, as
he must, that "It]he Bank should be able to adjust to changed circumstances . . . , but this can only be brought about through the initiative

16. 22 U.S.C. § 262g (1988).
17. BROWN, supra note 1, at 237.
18. See generally Shihata, supra note 12, at 135-80 (analysis by World Bank General

Counsel in chapter entitled "The World Bank and the Environment-A Legal Perspective").
19. BROWN, supra note 1, at 198. Cf. Shihata, supra note 11, at 133 (statement by World
Bank General Counsel that no balanced development can be achieved without the realization
of a minimum degree of all human rights, material or otherwise, in an environment that allows
each people to preserve its culture while continuously improving its living standards).
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of the member states." 20 His hollow efforts, however, to distinguish
injurious "politicization" from "constructive" reform advocated by member
States demonstrate the inherent futility of defining and identifying
impermissible "politicization" in legal terms. For, however "constructive"
and successful it may have appeared, the premises of the environmental
reform campaign in large measure have been precisely the opposite of the
principles espoused in The United States and the Politicization of the
World Bank.
This book treats environmental questions as technical, scientific, and
methodological, and therefore related to the fundamental economic mission
of the Bank in a way that human rights is not. Environmental activism,
however, played a key role in the peaceful political revolutions in the
countries of Eastern Europe, which are now targeted for a significant
amount of World Bank lending in order to achieve environmental and
other goals. More generally, the relationship between public participation
in governmental decision-making processes - i.e., democracy - and
environmental quality has now been firmly established at the highest level
of universality as an international standard in the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, 2' adopted by over 100 heads of State at
the United Nations Conference and Development in June 1992. As such,
environmental concerns in many cases have been the thin end of the
wedge for demands for greater public scrutiny and accountability of the
actions of Bank staff and member country governments - a situation that
is unlikely to be described as apolitical and in any event is not confined
purely to the realm of economics. For similar reasons, U.S. policy on
environment at the World Bank directly challenges the author's vision
of technocratic decisionmaking by highly trained bureaucratic elites
through

20. BROWN, supra note 1, at 237.
21. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876, THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) 118 (Stanley P.

Johnson ed., 1993), 3 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS 1617 (Nicholas Robinson ed.,
1992), 22 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 268 (1992), 1 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 348

(1992). Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration provides as follows:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public
authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their
communities [sic], and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes.
States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making

information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.
Rio Declaration, supra, princ. 10.
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active and systematic encouragement of participation by borrowing
countries['] nongovernmental environmental, community and indigenous peoples' organizations at all stages of preparations for
country lending strategies, policy based loans, and loans that may
have adverse environmental or sociocultural impacts; and full
availability to concerned or affected nongovernmental and community organization[s], early in the preparation phase and at all
subsequent stages of planning[,] of full documentary information
concerning details of design and potential environmental and
sociocultural impacts of proposed loans.22
II. "POLITICIZATION" AS IMPERMISSIBLE INSTRUCTION OF
NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO THE BANK

Of necessity, The United States and the Politicization of the World
Bank addresses the implications of structural and institutional considerations in the governance of the Bank. One Governor, ordinarily that
country's finance minister, represents each member State at the Bank. The
Board of Governors meets as a body once a year and in practice gives
only very general guidance to the Bank's professional staff. Twenty-four
Executive Directors, appointed or elected by member country governments, represent member nations in Washington on a day-to-day basis,
have offices physically located in the World Bank complex, and approve
staff proposals for individual loans. As in the case of the other major
donor States of Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, the
U.S. Executive Director represents no other member States. Other
Executive Directors represent groups of countries, some of them quite
curious. For instance, one Executive Director represents the unlikely
configuration of the Netherlands, Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia,
Israel, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. The individual generally
identified as the Executive Director from Canada, a donor State, also
represents most of the Caribbean countries, which are borrowers.23
The Board of Executive Directors takes decisions by weighted
majority voting. Votes are allocated according to a formula that depends
on the number of a member State's shares and its capital contribution to
the institution.24 So, among the 177 current IBRD members, the United

22. 22 U.S.C. § 262m-5(b)(4), (5) (1988).
23. See 1993 WORLD BANK ANN. REP. 232.

24. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. V, § 3, 60 Stat. at 1451, 2 U.N.T.S.
at 162; IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. VI, § 3, 11 U.S.T. at 2296-97, 439
U.N.T.S. at 270.
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States now exercises somewhat more than seventeen percent of the total
voting power in the IBRD, nearly three times as much as the next
largest shareholder, Japan.
To some, the nature and scope of the Executive Directors' authority
over the Bank's operations and its management and professional staff is
somewhat unclear. Based on the text of the Bank's constitutional
treaties,25 an opinion of the Bank's General Counsel asserts that member
governments "are under an obligation not to influence the Bank's President and staff in the discharge of their duties, and Executive Directors
are under the duty not to act as the instrumentality of members to exert
such prohibited influence. 26
The author of The United States and the Politicizationof the World
Bank does not take such a categorical view. He notes that the negotiating history of the Bank's Articles of Agreement reflects not only this
position, but also a competing view advanced by the United States and
similarly accommodated by the text of the Bank's constituent instruments. From this opposing perspective, the Executive Directors are
subject to direct supervision by member country governments. Any
ambiguity, however, has supposedly been removed because "the [subsequent] practice of the Bank and its member states has reflected a
clear but limited consensus to the effect that members are not to use
their voting rights in that organization as a political tool for the pursuit
of objectives unrelated to the Bank's purposes.,27 As a result, concludes
the author, the Executive Directors "have what might be referred to as a
political responsibility to defend the national interests of the governments they represent, but they also have responsibilities as members of
an international organ. '"28 Consequently, the activities of Executive
Directors may reflect national positions, but only so long as instructions

25. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
26. See Shihata, supra note 12, at 107 (quotation and analysis by World Bank General
Counsel of his own internal memorandum). According to this view, the Bank's Executive
Directors are "officers ...of the Bank" who "owe their duty entirely to the Bank and to no
other authority." IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. V, § 5(c), 60 Stat. at 1452,
2 U.N.T.S. at 166. Consequently, the Executive Directors are subject to the prohibition on
"interfer[ing] in the political affairs of any member [and] be[ing] influenced ...by the
political character of the member or members concerned" in the exercise of their voting rights
because "[o]nly economic considerations shall be relevant to [the] decisions" of the Bank and
its officers. Id. art. IV, § 10, 60 Stat. at 1449, 2 U.N.T.S. at 158; see also supra note 6 and
accompanying text. The memorandum consequently concludes that "[t]he Chairman of the
Board [of Executive Directors] is entitled to rule out of order a political debate or statement
which does not have a clear relevance to the economic considerations related to the subject
matter under discussion." See Shihata, supra note 12, at 46.
27. BROWN, supra note 1, at 236.
28. Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
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from the governments represented by those individuals are consistent
with the goals and purposes of the Bank. Presumably the Executive
Directors are then under a legal obligation to disregard impermissible
attempts at instruction by member country governments for prohibited
political purposes.
Both the Bank's legal opinion and the author of this book acknowledge that, at least in some cases, allegiance to the Bank requires
Executive Directors to disregard the parochial interests of member State
governments. On a practical level, this conclusion mirrors the central
lacuna identified by this book: the absence of a meaningful test for
distinguishing between permissible instructions on issues within the
scope of the Bank's goals and purposes on the one hand, and improper
"political" directives on the other. For the Executive Director representing the United States, this is a problem with immediate and pressing
implications. As the author notes, it is no secret that the Executive
Branch has routinely flouted prohibitions on direct instruction of the
U.S. Executive Director, who until recently has held a concurrent appointment as a special assistant to the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.
More profoundly, the author's conclusion with respect to the appropriate role of the Bank's Executive Directors raises very real questions of accountability. For, if the Bank's professional staff is subject to
direction by the Board, and the Board's responsibility is strictly to the
Bank as an institution, to whom is the Bank itself ultimately accountable? Quite plainly, this functional perspective tends to attenuate
seriously the authority of member country governments over the Bank's
professional staff. At the starkest extreme, accountability is the price of
efficiency and efficacy.
By comparison with the International Labor Organization and the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, both of
which are cited as examples of undesirable "politicization," the World
Bank is driven much more by the discretionary activities of its
professional staff, which has considerable autonomy in achieving a clearly
identifiable, operational, on-the-ground mission: lending very large sums
of money.2 9 In the fiscal year that ended in the middle of 1993, the IBRD
and IDA together approved 245 loans and credits totalling $23.7 billion,"
many of which financed major development projects. If the author's
criticisms were to be fully accepted, there is every reason to believe that
a technocratic view of the world, in the case of the Bank founded on

29. See Stephen Zamora, Voting in InternationalEconomic Organizations,74 AM. J. INT'L
L. 566, 589-90 (1980) (characterizing Board votes as legitimizing decisions made by staff).
30. 1993 WORLD BANK ANN. REP. 167.
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economics and economists, could be mobilized with limited or no
accountability to governments or the public. The author of The United
States and the Politicization of the World Bank acknowledges that the
"Western liberal economic philosophy,",3' in which "political and economic
or technical relations are fundamentally and rightly separable, 32 that
serves as the foundation for the World Bank and other Bretton Woods
institutions is not necessarily based on neutral, universally agreed principles. Alternative views, however, are
treated dismissively as "to some
33
extent reflect[ing] Marxist thought.,
Serious consequences of this Weltanschauung that are anything but
Marxist are readily apparent from the point of view of the public in
borrowing countries, the intended beneficiaries of Bank lending. To the
extent that the activities of the Bank's professional staff are partially
shielded from influence by member country governments, individuals and
organizations that represent them may have no right to be consulted in
decisions, such as the financing of large dams that displace thousands of
people, that affect their very lives and livelihoods. While that situation is
slowly changing, thanks to public criticism and efforts at reform from
within and outside the Bank, the most effective mechanism for influencing
the Bank is still through member country governments, most often those
of donor States.34
Under these circumstances, one person's "politicization" may be the
only route for another to achieve even a modicum of democratic representation in a highly technocratic setting. Public participation, in which
official decisions are made after input from affected non-State actors, has
assumed increasing prominence in recent years as a legitimizing factor in
the activities of technocratically oriented international bodies like the
World Bank, at least as a policy consideration if still perhaps not as a
matter of customary international law.35 Significantly, on the domestic
level, the analogue of a strictly "functional" approach has been rejected
in favor of a structure in which public policy is shaped not only by
technical considerations, but also by substantive goals. defined at least in
part by overtly political considerations and direct public input into the
regulatory process.36

31. BROWN, supra note 1, at 23.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership:A Model
for Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645 (1991).
35. See, e.g., id.
36. See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process:A Critical

Review, 14 COLUM. J.ENVTL. L. 501, 546 (1989) (arguing that administrative process "should
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Indeed, one could imagine a parallel book entitled "The Democratization of the World Bank" that describes attempts to inject elementary
principles of good government, such as access to information and opportunities for public comment, into the Bank's governance using many of
the techniques dismissed as impermissible "politicization" in The United
States and the Politicizationof the World Bank. Precisely to fill this gap
by assuring a measure of independent, objective oversight of the activities
of its staff, the Bank's Board of Executive Directors recently created a
new, independent Inspection Panel to which both governments and
nongovernmental organizations may appeal the staff's failures to observe
the Bank's own internal standards or Bank staff's inadequate supervision
of the implementation of loan covenants by borrowers.37 Interestingly, the
author identifies the very lack of access to Bank documentation as a prime
cause of "hidden politicization, 38 but he engages in little reflection as to
how this situation might be changed except by pressure from member
country governments that itself might well be described as "politicized."
The book is generally thin in its treatment of the real world dynamics
that result from the organization of the Bank, the structure of the U.S.
Government, and interactions between the two. Often acts or statements
are attributed to the Bank as such, with little attention to the relationship
between the Bank's professional staff and its Board of Executive
Directors, which is crucial to a thorough understanding of the institution's
decision-making processes and their potential for "politicization." The
author barely attempts to distinguish political activities of Bank member
country governments and the Executive Directors that represent them from
the responses of the Bank's professional management to political
pressures. When distinctions are made, the author pays very inordinate
attention to the role of the Board while giving short shrift to how the
Bank's professional staff exercises its considerable discretion. In the case
study of a hiatus in lending during the Allende regime in Chile, for

reflect democratic values and the intellectual contributions of democratic theory" notwithstanding
the public's lack of technical expertise); Robert Reich explains:
The job of the public administrator is not merely to make decisions on the public's
behalf, but to help the public deliberate over the decisions that need to be made.
Rather than view debate and controversy as managerial failures that make policymaking and implementation more difficult, the public administrator should see them as

natural and desirable aspects of the formation of public values, contributing to
society's self-understanding.
Robert B. Reich, Public Administrationand Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE
L.J. 1617, 1637 (1985).
37. See The World Bank Inspection Panel, I.B.R.D. Res. No. 93-10; I.D.A. Res. No. 93-6
(Sept. 22, 1993) (copy on file with Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw).
38. BROWN, supra note 1, at 240-42.
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example, "politicization" appears to have been accomplished with barely
a single negative vote from the U.S. Executive Director at the Board
level.3 9 The author acknowledges in his conclusion that "the most effective
politicizing actions are those which succeed in blocking loans before they
are presented to the Bank's Executive Directors."' He then throws up his
hands, however, observing that "[w]here the politicizing influence is
applied subtly and behind the scenes, it is more difficult to monitor and
to regulate.'
Likewise, much of the "politicizing" legislation must be read against
a tug of war between the U.S. Congress and the Executive over the role
of the United States in the governance of the Bank. While the author
correctly observes that the Executive Branch, which is the point of contact
for the U.S. Executive Director to the Bank, has been reluctant to serve
as merely a transmission belt for implementing congressional policies at
the Bank, this very important factor receives little additional attention
beyond mere identification. So, for instance, the author observes that
"[tihe US government has been notoriously unsuccessful in enlisting the
support of other Bank members for its politically inspired 'no' vote
positions" '42 in the Bank's Board of Executive Directors as a result of
legislative mandates. Hardly considered is the possibility that this
phenomenon might result from a rote, as opposed to enthusiastic, implementation of these congressional directives by the Executive Branch
in which there is little or no desire on the part of the latter to secure the
support of other Bank member countries.

III.

"POLITICIZATION"

AS UNILATERAL ECONOMIC COERCION

The author of The United States and the Politicizationof the World
Bank goes on to identify "politicization" as a violation of norms of
international law outlawing economic coercion whose source is custom
or other authority besides the World Bank's constituent treaties. The book
strongly criticizes the assumption that "unilateral economic coercion
(initiated by one sender state acting alone) cannot be exercised through
institutions such as the multilateral development banks. 43 Rather, the
author asserts that the multilateral institution of the Bank itself can engage
in proscribed unilateral coercion, as distinct from the direct exercise of
39. Id. at 169.
40. Id. at 235.
41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Id. at 10.
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suasion between Bank member countries through bilateral channels such
as foreign assistance provided by a single donor State. The work's
analysis, which concludes that unilateral economic coercion can occur
through the exercise of power or the abuse of rights in an attempt to
influence the policies of a multilateral forum like the World Bank, should
be extremely controversial.
Loan agreements between the Bank and borrowing countries have a
status in international law similar to that of treaties. 44 As suggested by this
characterization, the critical element of consent is fundamental to the
relationship between the Bank and the borrower. Lending proposals must
be agreed by the professional staff and the borrowing country government
before presentation to the Board of Executive Directors for subsequent
approval. Bank staff may refuse to pursue negotiations on a loan proposal,
or negotiations between the borrowing country government and the Bank
may break down. Although at the negotiation stage there may be some
potential for "politicization" as described in this book, the Bank's
professional staff is not under the direct, day-to-day control of the Board
of Executive Directors. Even at the Board level, a member country can
hardly be said to have a legally identifiable right to a particular loan,
because loan proposals must be approved by the Board.
Alternatively, World Bank member States might have a legal right,
whose source is the Bank's Articles of Agreement, to an "impartial[]"
decision-making process in which "[o]nly economic considerations shall
be relevant., 45 But even then, an aggrieved Bank member State could
terminate all "coercion" by merely discontinuing further discussions with
Bank staff. The author cites no primary authority that suggests the
contrary. While norms of international law that might govern the exercise
of unequal bargaining power in a consensual setting could have some
relevance in this context, the author does not allude to any such principles.
Norms governing duress or coercion that might invalidate a treaty under
international law generally demand a considerably higher threshold
involving the threat of or actual use of force.46 The author understandably

44. See Lester Nurick, CertainAspects of the Law and Practice of the InternationalBank
for Reconstruction and Development, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
100, 127 (Stephen M. Schwebel ed., 1971) (statement by World Bank Deputy General Counsel).

45. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. IV, § 10, 60 Stat. at 1449, 2 U.N.T.S.
at 158; IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. V, § 6, 11 U.S.T. at 2294, 439 U.N.T.S.
at 266-68. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 52, S. EXEC.
Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875
(1969) ("A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.").
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and correctly does not characterize negotiations between the Bank and its
borrowing members as rising to the level of threat of force or actual force.
In discussing a series of negative Board votes by the United States
motivated by concern for India's nuclear policy, the author acknowledges
the weaknesses in his reasoning. "[Wlithout the support of other [World
Bank] members," he observes, those votes "could not actually affect the
rights of India within the IDA" 47 and were of "purely symbolic" significance.4 8 Presumably for this reason, after conceding that "it is hard to
escape the conclusion that any conditions placed upon bilateral aid by the
donor are voluntarily consented to by the recipient, '49 the author devotes
a scant three pages to the legality of influencing recipient countries
through the channel of development assistance, citing only one marginally
persuasive interpretive reference and no primary sources. While the
treatment of bilateral aid is thin, the author provides no authority whatsoever for the proposition that lending provided through multilateral
channels like the World Bank has violated customary norms of international law.
In any event, it is far from clear that a single State - even a country
like the United States operating in a weighted decision-making context,
but still with less than one-fifth of the voting power in the World Bank
- could be said to be exercising prohibited unilateral pressure in a
multilateral setting. The only actions with legal effect in the multilateral
institution are those taken by the Bank itself, acting through its prescribed
constitutional processes, and not those of individual members. Even the
five largest donors to the Bank acting in concert could not by themselves
assure that a particular loan proposal would be disapproved. Such a level
of agreement would arguably qualify as a legally significant pattern of
behavior. With that level of consensus, moreover, the Bank's Board of
Executive Directors could formally render a definitive interpretation of the
institution's constituent treaties. 50
The author admits as much by rejecting a rigidly textual interpretation
of the Bank's Articles of Agreement based strictly on the original intent
of the drafters in favor of an "evolving, dynamic" 5' view of the World

47. BROWN, supra note 1, at 26.
48. Id. at 25-26.
49. Id. at 84.
50. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. IX(a), 60 Stat. at 1460, 2 U.N.T.S. at
186 ("Any question of interpretation of this Agreement arising between any member and the
Bank or between any members of the Bank shall be submitted to the Executive Directors for
their decision."); see also IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. X(a), 11 U.S.T. at 2308,
439 U.N.T.S. at 288 (same).

51. BROWN, supra note 1, at 99.
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Bank as responsive to changing needs. Indeed, it is precisely this tension
between the Bank's narrowly circumscribed economic mission on the one
hand and the imperative to operate in larger contextual settings on the
other that gives rise to the central dilemma identified, but hardly resolved,
in this book.
The question of the legality of conditions on development assistance
is of far more than just theoretical concern. The Bank's borrowing
countries have on occasion objected to environmental conditions in loan
agreements not as ill-judged exercise of Bank staff's considerable discretion or even as departures from the Bank's Articles of Agreement. Instead,
so-called "green conditionality" has been attacked as an outright violation
of sovereignty that implies an infringement of the exclusive prerogative
of borrowing States to govern within their territories.52 These grossly
overstated objections go well beyond those in this book. Nonetheless,
those complaints demonstrate the potential for the author's flawed analysis
to undermine, rather than to enhance, the Bank's capacity to fulfill its
mission of encouraging the adoption of "constructive" policies in developing countries. 3 By mistakenly asserting that the actions of the Bank as an
institution could violate customary norms proscribing unilateral economic
coercion, this book's approach may well impede realization of "the need
for evolutionary development in [the Bank's] mandate" 54 identified by the
author himself.
CONCLUSION

The United States and the Politicizationof the World Bank addresses
a question that has assumed great importance in both practice and
principle. Overall, the book is a very thoughtful and meticulous effort that
codifies, elaborates, and embellishes a straightforward, mainstream
approach to the World Bank as an institution. The author takes the Bank's
principal legal authorities at face value, largely accepts the institution's
interpretation of those instruments, and carries his analysis about as far
as possible within those confines. The case studies are carefully documented and dissected, with copious references to primary materials. This
work appears to contain the first published inventory and evaluation of
U.S. legislation intended to influence the World Bank and the U.S. posture
within that international financial institution. Additionally, the book
contains an extensive bibliography and a mildly helpful index.

52. See, e.g., World Bank: Greener Faces for Its Greenbacks, ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 1989,
at 41.

53.

BROWN, supra note 1, at

54. Id.

237.
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But in the end, the author provides little insight into the task he sets
out for himself: establishing legal standards for "politicization." Ironically,
the book is most successful in exposing the limits of legal analysis and
the need to consider alternative points of view. Unfortunately, the author
never resolves the contradictions he himself identifies. The problem is that,
depending on the context and the perspective of the observer, broad gauge
social and human welfare issues like environment and human rights may
be political, economic, neither, or both, with no clear demarcation between
categories. Even Bank staff has difficulty in making these distinctions with
precision, and the calculus may also change over time. The complexity
of distinguishing in a legally meaningful way between actions that have
a genuine economic justification and those for which an economic
rationale is a mere pretext may exacerbate rather than ameliorate difficulties in particular concrete situations like the case studies fastidiously documented in this book.
Even if the book was successful in its goal, the application of legal
standards to the actions of Bank member countries and the institution's
professional staff might ultimately be a pointless exercise, unless the
underlying causes of "politicization" are identified and addressed. Although
'
the author observes that "[p]oliticization is often said to be increasing,"55
there is little reason to believe that a legal examination of the question will
necessarily affect the behavior of sovereign States presently inclined toward
"politicization" in the exercise of their rights and privileges in a highly
discretionary, evolving, and dynamic setting. The temptation to attempt
to free international institutions from political constraints, as advocated
by the author of this book, is very great. However, the book ultimately
provides only a limited and unsatisfying prescription for assuring that such
an approach will operate effectively in the face of rampant "politicization."
At the most fundamental level, the book's unsuccessful attempt to grapple
with its central task demonstrates the need for an alternative to apolitical,
functional theories of international organization. The example of the World
Bank further highlights the potentially high costs in terms of democratic
accountability if technocratic institutions are insulated from political
controls. In the end, it may be that "politicization" is not all bad, but may,
at least in some cases, serve as a necessary check on the concentration of
power in international bureaucratic elites.

55. Id. at 13.

